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ABSTRACT 
 
Infants have a remarkable ability to perceive all manner of phonetic contrasts. The phonological 
categories of a language, however, have to be learned from experience. Two learning paradigms 
are contrasted – supervised learning (where learners receive feedback on their categorization 
attempts) and unsupervised learning (where learners rely only on properties of the input). It is 
argued that unsupervised learning may be the appropriate paradigm, at least for the initial stages 
of acquisition. Thereafter, the emergence of phoneme categories draws on various kinds of 
knowledge available to the learner, including knowledge of articulation, and of literacy 
conventions. A concluding section emphasizes the taxonomic nature of the phoneme, and 
suggests that the special salience of a phonemic representation reflects the status of the phoneme 
as a basic level category. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In a well-known passage, Saussure commented on what our mental experience would be like if 
we did not possess language: 
 
Psychologiquement, abstraction faite de son expression par les mots, notre pensée n’est 
qu’une masse amorphe et indistincte. … [S]ans le secours des signes, nous serions 
incapables de distinguer deux idées d’une façon claire et constante. Prise en elle-même, la 
pensée est comme une nébuleuse où rien n’est nécessairement délimité. Il n’y a pas 
d’idées préétablies, et rien n’est distinct avant l’apparition de la langue (Saussure, 1915: 
155).1 
 
Without language, Saussure claimed, thought would be inherently featureless and unstructured. 
For Saussure, it was language – more specifically, the conceptual categories symbolized by 
language – that gave structure to the amorphous substance that is prelinguistic thought. Saussure 
made an analogous claim about the sound substance of language. Without the mediation of a 
language and its phonological system, the speech signal would be equally indistinct and formless: 
 
La substance phonique n’est pas plus fixe ni plus rigide; ce n’est pas un moule dont la 
pensée doive nécessairement épouser les formes, mais une matière plastique qui se divise 
à son tour en parties distinctes pour fournir des signifiants dont la pensée a besoin 
(Saussure, 1915: 155).2 
 
We can, of course, only speculate about the mental life of a person without language – a new 
born infant, for example, or a wild child. We are on firmer ground when it comes to our 
perception of the speech signal in ignorance of the linguistic categories which it encodes. When 
we are listening to a language which is totally unknown to us, Saussure’s metaphor of the 
‘nébuleuse’, where nothing seems clearly delineated, seems particularly apt. Learning the 
language consists inter alia of learning to ‘make sense’ of the acoustic signal, segmenting it into 
distinct units, classifying the units and their combinations, and, ultimately, recognizing in the 
signal the expression of meaningful words and phrases. This is a process which each child (with 
the exception, of course, of the profoundly deaf) must go through. In this paper, I comment on 
some aspects of this remarkable achievement, with special focus on the emergence of segmental 
categories. 
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II. PHONOLOGICAL UNITS 
One might suppose that mastering the sound system of a language would consist in learning to 
make progressively finer perceptual distinctions amongst the sounds that one encounters in the 
acoustic signal. Much ingenious experimentation, however, has demonstrated that this is not how 
first language acquisition proceeds. It is now well established that newborn infants are exquisitely 
sensitive to speech sounds, being able to discriminate all manner of contrasts which are utilized 
in the various languages of the world (Aslin et al., 1998; Aslin et al., 1981; Eimas et al., 1971; 
Jusczyk, 1997; Kuhl, 1987; Werker & Tees, 1984). While this remarkable ability surely 
facilitates entry into the sound system of whatever language a child is going to learn, the ability 
to discriminate sounds is not sufficient for phonological acquisition to take place. A person able 
to perceive all manner of acoustic-phonetic differences would be rather like Luria’s (1968) 
mnemonist, or the fictitious Funes of Borges’s (1964) story – individuals with a phenomenal 
ability to notice and remember every detail of their experiences but who, as a consequence, are 
unable to generalize and form abstractions. For speech perception to get under way, it is 
necessary for categories of acoustic events to be recognized in the kaleidoscope of auditory 
impressions.3 Some chunks of the acoustic signal need to be regarded, in the phonological system 
that is being acquired, as being ‘the same’ as other chunks. The first question we need to ask, 
therefore, concerns the nature of these chunks that the learner needs to identify. There are at least 
three plausible candidates with regard to the linear segmentation of the speech signal (the list is 
not exhaustive, and the kinds are not mutually exclusive): Words, syllables, and parts of 
syllables. 
That competent hearers of a language perceive words in the stream of speech is self-
evident. Listening to speech is essentially a matter of listening for words, and word-like units, and 
learning a language involves, amongst other things, learning the sound shapes of words.4 Indeed, 
Jusczyk (1997: 108) suggests that the identification of words in the stream of speech is what 
“speech perception capacities are ultimately intended for”, while others have proposed that the 
learner’s identification of word-sized units may well bootstrap the whole language acquisition 
process (Beckman & Edwards, 2000; Beckman & Pierrehumbert, 2000).  
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During the earliest stages of language acquisition, it may well be the case that words are 
learned, stored, and retrieved as phonological wholes, without internal analysis (Jusczyk, 1997; 
Vihman, 1996). While a reliance on gestalt storage might be viable at a time when the child’s 
linguistic repertoire consists of at most a couple of dozen items, the increasing size of the child’s 
lexicon necessitates other, or additional storage modalities. This is because the number of holistic 
sound shapes that a person could reliably differentiate and commit to memory is severely limited. 
As the size of the lexicon increases, some kind of internal analysis of the word-sized units 
becomes necessary. Thus, pieces of one word might be identified with pieces of other words, the 
pieces themselves might in turn be broken down into even smaller units. In this way, a relatively 
small inventory of phonological units, and patterns for their combination, will be able to support 
the learning of a large and ever expanding lexicon.5 
Candidates for the internal analysis of words are syllables, parts of syllables (such as 
onsets and rhymes), and, ultimately, consonant and vowel segments. Syllables, as units of 
analysis, would seem to be especially appropriate for languages such as Japanese and Māori, 
where the number of possible syllables in the language is quite limited. This is reflected in the 
katakana and hiragana writings systems of Japanese, in which each syllable is represented by a 
distinct symbol (exactly 46 are needed.). When the number of different syllables in a language 
increases, internal analysis once again becomes necessary. Thus, traditional accounts of 
Mandarin phonology analyze the 400 or so occurring syllables (this number disregards tonal 
differentiation) in terms of the combination of initials and finals, i.e. onsets and rhymes. For 
English, and other languages with complex syllable structures, in which the number of different 
syllables runs into the thousands, further analysis is necessary, namely into the individual 
phonemes (or, perhaps better, the positional allophones) which make up the syllables. 
Words, syllables, and phonemes/allophones, as units of perception and representation, all 
raise the same problem, namely, that of acoustic variability. A word, syllable, or phoneme can be 
pronounced in a virtually unlimited number of ways according to the linguistic context of the unit 
(its immediate phonetic environment, its place within an intonation contour, the overall rate of 
speech, etc.) as well as speaker-dependent properties (dialect, gender, age, speaker-specific 
properties of the vocal tract, and even such factors as the state of the speaker’s dentures). 
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Bloomfield (1933) had supposed that various manifestations of a phoneme would share some 
common acoustic features. The invention of spectrographic analysis in the 1940’s, however, and 
early attempts to synthesize speech by concatenating invariant segments, brought home to 
phoneticians in a particularly dramatic way the lack of acoustic invariance associated with the 
units that we hear in the speech signal (Potter et al., 1947). Liberman and his colleagues 
(Liberman et al., 1967; Liberman & Mattingly, 1985) developed their ‘motor theory’ of speech 
perception largely in response to this state of affairs. Specifically, they sought to locate 
invariance, not in the signal itself, but rather in the motor commands which gave rise to the 
acoustic signal. Later versions of the theory located invariance, not in the motor commands 
themselves, but in a speaker’s “intended phonetic gestures” (Liberman & Mattingly, 1985: 2), 
thereby pushing the invariants into a domain which in principle is out of reach of empirical 
observation. 
The invariance problem is a familiar one to categorization researchers. In fact, the (largely 
unsuccessful) search for acoustic constants in the speech signal following the invention of 
spectrographic analysis is merely a variation on the theme of the non-viability of ‘classical’ 
categories in general. Classical categories, it will be recalled, are defined in terms of a set of 
necessary and sufficient features. Especially from the 1970’s onwards, it became apparent that 
most categories that people operate with – for example, the categories that are conventionally 
named by the lexemes of their language – are not in fact susceptible to classical definitions; 
moreover, the features which supposedly define the categories are subject to the very same 
problem (Taylor, 2003b, to apppear). In light of these findings, various alternative models of 
categorization were developed. These included prototype models (in which categories are centred 
around ‘good examples’), probabilistic models (in which categories are defined in terms of 
weighted probabilities of features), and exemplar models (where categories are constituted in 
terms of the similarity of already encountered instances). In view of this extensive research 
(reviewed in Murphy, 2002; see also Mompeán, 2002: Ch. 1) it should come as no surprise that 
phonemes, syllables, and words should also resist definition in terms of sets of invariant acoustic 
features. 
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III. SUPERVISED OR UNSUPERVISED LEARNING? 
The ‘discovery’ of the phoneme has been described as “one of the most magnificent 
achievements of linguistic science” (Krámský, 1974: 7). The hyperbole of this statement conceals 
the fact that the phoneme concept is by no means a modern invention. It is the basis of all 
alphabetic writing systems (though, to be sure, few writing systems are consistently phonemic), 
and even speakers of unwritten languages are reported to have intuitive access to the phonemic 
structure of words.6 Symptomatic of the popular acceptance of the notion is the fact that most 
monolingual and bilingual dictionaries nowadays give word pronunciations in some form of 
phonemic transcription. Yet, like many of the most basic concepts of linguistics – such as ‘word’, 
for example – a concise definition remains elusive, and indeed the phoneme concept has been, 
and remains, the subject of intense and ongoing theoretical controversies. Later in the paper I will 
touch on generative phonologists’ rejection of the need for a distinct phonemic level of 
representation. In the meantime, I focus on some of the controversies which engaged the 
linguistic community in pre-generative days. Indeed, a glance at the journals of the time – as well 
as at the contents page of Joos’s (1957) influential Readings in linguistics – gives the impression 
that the history of North American linguistics during the mid decades of the last century was in 
large part a confrontation with the problematics of the phoneme concept.  
A major issue in pre-generative times concerned the criteria by which the phonemes of a 
language are to be established. One of the orthodoxies of the time was the prohibition on the 
‘mixing of levels’ (Bloch, 1948; Hockett, 1942). The idea was that the investigation of a 
language should proceed in a strictly ‘bottom-up’ fashion. The investigating linguist first made 
detailed phonetic transcriptions of a corpus of native speaker utterances. Observation of the 
distribution of phonetic segments (‘phones’) would then permit the allocation of these segments 
to a fixed set of phonemes, accompanied by statements for the possible realizations of each 
phoneme in various contexts. Importantly, phonemic analysis was to be conducted without any 
reference to ‘higher’ levels, such as the words and morphemes of the language, nor, or course, to 
their meanings.7 Subsequently, linguistic analysis would proceed to the identification of 
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allomorphs and their allocation to morphemes (again, without reference to their meaning), 
followed by the identification of word classes, syntactic patterns, and so on (Harris, 1951). 
These discussions (for a review, see Heitner, 2005) may strike the modern reader as very 
arcane. Pike (1947), for one, ventured to state that no field linguist would ever proceed in the way 
demanded by the orthodoxy of the time, by ignoring meaning and strictly excluding any ‘top-
down’ analysis. Nevertheless, I would suggest that the issues that were discussed in the 1940’s 
and 1950’s do relate to a matter which is very much of modern concern. Updating the discussions 
of more than half a century ago into more modern terminology – and fudging the distinction 
between the linguist’s analytic procedures and the processes of language learning by children 
(and by machines)8 – the question would be whether phoneme categories can emerge in 
unsupervised as opposed to supervised learning conditions. In supervised learning, the learner 
(whether human or machine) is presented with a set of stimuli which are labeled as members or 
non-members of the target category or categories (the labeling may take the form of feedback on 
the correctness or otherwise of the learner’s attempts at categorization). Subsequently, the learner 
may be tested on new stimuli, which are presented without labeling or feedback, with the aim of 
determining how well the categories have been learned, and how ‘ambiguous’, or otherwise 
problematic stimuli will be handled. In unsupervised learning, on the other hand, the learner is 
simply presented with a set of stimuli and is required to group them into categories. The stimuli 
are not labeled, no feedback is provided, nor is the learner given any hints as to how many or 
what kinds of categories are to be formed.  
It will be apparent that a strict application of the dogma of the separation of levels is in 
essence a prescription for unsupervised learning. Indeed, linguists of the time were much 
concerned with developing a set of ‘discovery procedures’ – that is, a set of algorithms – which 
would correctly, and ‘automatically’, identify the phonemes of a language, given only a narrow 
phonetic transcription. The phonemic analysis would ‘emerge’ from the phonetic properties of a 
corpus, without the analyst needing to be aware that two phonetically similar stretches were 
merely variant pronunciations of the same word (i.e., that the pronunciations were in free 
variation), or whether they in fact constituted pronunciations of different words (i.e., constituted 
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minimal pairs). If access to this latter kind of information were to be available, we would be in 
the domain of supervised learning.  
The period in question – the 1940’s and 1950’s – is commonly referred to as the heyday 
of Bloomfieldian linguistics, reflecting the towering influence of Bloomfield’s monograph 
Language (1933). It may be interesting, therefore, to recall Bloomfield’s position on phonemic 
analysis. We have already referred to Bloomfield’s belief that a sufficiently sophisticated acoustic 
analysis would eventually reveal the invariant properties definitional of each phoneme of a 
language. For Bloomfield, however, the search for these invariant properties could not be basis of 
phonemic analysis. Rather, linguistic analysis was based on what for Bloomfield was the 
“fundamental assumption of linguistics”, namely, that “in every speech-community some 
utterances are alike in form and meaning” (1933: 78). Thus, according to Bloomfield,  
 
…even a perfected knowledge of acoustics will not, by itself, give us the phonemic 
structure a language. We shall always have to know which of the gross acoustic features 
are, by virtue of meanings, ‘the same’, and which are different for the speakers 
(Bloomfield, 1933: 128). 
 
The irony of Bloomfield’s position has not escaped some commentators (Harris, 1973; Taylor, 
2003b). Bloomfield, who was so intent on excluding ‘mentalistic’ notions, such as ‘meanings’, 
from linguistic analysis, had to postulate ‘sameness of meaning’ as a prerequisite for any 
linguistic analysis at all. Be that as it may, the relevance of Bloomfield’s observation to the 
present topic will be evident. Bloomfield was proclaiming the impossibility, in principle, of 
unsupervised language learning.  
And, indeed, common sense would seem to be on Bloomfield’s side. Consider the 
acquisition of word meanings. The child encounters a range of creatures of different shapes, 
sizes, colours, and habitats, and exhibiting different temperaments and behaviours. Some of these 
creatures are referred to as ‘dogs’, others bear different labels, such as ‘cat’, ‘rabbit’, ‘cow’, 
‘mouse’, as well as ‘animal’ and ‘pet’, The child’s task, now, is to work out the criteria for this 
classification, on the assumption that the different uses of dog are ‘the same in meaning’, that is, 
that they designate one and the same category of entities. It was in such terms that Brown (1958) 
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presented ‘The Original Word Game’. On this account, the learner’s task would be exactly 
analogous to that confronted by subjects participating in a supervised learning experiment. Some 
such process would seem to be indicated, if only because different speech communities typically 
categorize the environment in different ways. For example, English, French, and German 
distinguish ‘rats’ from ‘mice’, whereas Italian does not, both kinds of creature bearing the label 
‘topo’. Language-specific categories presumably do not, and could not, emerge from simple 
observation of the world; they have to be transmitted from one generation of speakers to the next 
by engagement in the ‘word game’.  
Appealing as it is, the ‘word game’, and the parallels with supervised learning, may not be 
the whole story. In a supervised learning experiment, a subject is presented with an array of 
experimental stimuli and is explicitly informed about their category membership. The counterpart 
of this situation in language acquisition would be that a word is explicitly associated with its 
referent on each occasion of its use. Yet it is not always the case that words, even words which 
designate easily observable entities, are uttered in the presence of their referents, and even when 
they are, the child still has to figure out just which features of the environment are to be matched 
with a given word. Gleitman (1990), in addressing the common belief that words are learned by 
ostension, urges us to ‘look and see’ whether words are indeed spoken in situations in which their 
referents are perceptually salient to the learners. She concludes that, in many cases, they are not. 
Indeed, detailed observations by Gleitman suggest that learning by ostension may actually be the 
exception rather than the rule. And in the case of words designating ‘abstract’ entities and 
processes, such as think, believe, and know, the words’ referents may not be candidates for 
ostension at all. The task faced by the language learner, then, is not simply one of working out 
the correct categorization of an array of labeled stimuli. The learner must first discover what the 
stimuli are that are to be categorized.  
The matter becomes more complicated still when we bear in mind that word learning is 
not only a question of learning semantic categories, the word forms themselves have to be 
learned. The learner, namely, has to realize that the multifarious ways in which dog can be 
pronounced all count as pronunciations of ‘the same word’. The learner could, in principle, 
explore the hypothesis that variations in the duration of the vowel, or whether the final consonant 
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is released or not, might correlate with meaning differences, e.g. big dogs vs. small dogs, brown 
dogs vs. spotted dogs, well-behaved dogs vs. yapping dogs. Children, presumably, do not 
systematically explore these possible correlations between form and meaning, any more than the 
field linguist would test each of the myriad hypothetical senses of gavagai, in Quine’s (1960) 
well-known example.9 As Bloomfield stated, the learner would need to be apprised of the fact 
that the various pronunciations are, indeed, ‘the same in form’, as well as being ‘the same in 
meaning’. 
There are, to be sure, certain circumstances in which a learner might be explicitly alerted 
to the fact that different pronunciations count as ‘the same’, while other pronunciations are ‘not 
the same’, as, for example, when second language learners are being trained on the discrimination 
of minimal pairs (ship vs. sheep, and the like). The extent of this practice with children acquiring 
their native language is probably quite limited, and is likely to be restricted, in any case, to older 
children perceived to be suffering from delayed development. (We should bear in mind, also, that 
languages are acquired in all manner of socio-cultural settings. Whether or not children are 
coached in matters of pronunciation, they all – barring pathological cases – end up with adult 
mastery of the ambient language.) One possibility might be that learners themselves ‘discover’ 
the existence of minimal pairs, by noting, for example, that the pronunciations of coat refer to 
one kind of entity, while the pronunciations of goat refer to a quite different kind of entity. The 
need to make the conceptual distinction would therefore trigger awareness of the corresponding 
phonological categories. Some researchers have indeed suggested some such mechanism of 
phoneme acquisition (Werker & Tees, 1984).10 
There are, however, a number of theoretical and empirical problems associated with the 
view that phoneme categories emerge on the back of minimal pairs. In the first place, while the 
existence of minimal pairs might be diagnostic of phoneme categories, it must fail as a definition 
of the phoneme. In English, there are scarcely any minimal pairs contrasting [ʃ], and [ʒ], or [θ] 
and [ð], yet we would still want to regard these sounds as belonging to different phonemes of 
English.11 Moreover, the existence of minimal pairs will be largely a matter of the size of a 
person’s lexicon. For young children, with very small vocabularies, minimal pairs, for any pair of 
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candidate sounds, are vanishingly rare. Caselli et al. (1995) list the first 50 words produced and 
understood by both English-speaking and Italian children. The English lists contain no minimal 
pairs, while the Italian lists contain only nonna ‘granny’ and nanna ‘sleep’. Even more telling is 
the fact that by the age of 1, children are already well on their way to perceiving the ambient 
language ‘phonemically’ (Jusczyk, 1997), that is, they are categorizing the ambient speech 
sounds in line with the phonological structure of the language they are to acquire. At this stage, 
children have scarcely learned any words of their language at all, so cannot be relying on lexical 
contrasts. Once again, we are forced to the conclusion that the supervised learning paradigm – 
where learners have the task of categorizing labeled stimuli – simply fails to apply.  
 The role of supervised learning (or, rather, its absence) turns up in connection with yet 
another issue in language acquisition research, namely, the problem of negative evidence 
(Bowerman, 1988; Pinker, 1984). In supervised category learning, learners receive feedback on 
whether their classification of a stimulus is correct or not. Yet when it comes to the learning of 
the syntactic structures of their language, children are rarely given information on which of their 
utterances are grammatically ill-formed. Caretakers may comment on the factual correctness of a 
child’s utterance, or on its stylistic or pragmatic appropriateness, but rarely, or not systematically, 
on its grammatical properties. A question that has much concerned researchers in language 
acquisition, therefore, is how a child comes to ‘unlearn’ the generalizations which give rise to 
utterances such as They didn’t wented, or He said me no. It clearly will not do to say that the 
learner comes to regard these expressions as ungrammatical because they are never encountered 
in the input. Many things that speakers say are unique creations, never before encountered, but 
are not, for that reason, to be rejected as ungrammatical. One factor that seems to be involved is 
the child’s working assumption that languages avoid synonymy (Clark, 1987). The learner comes 
to regard her own utterances as ill-formed to the extent that they are pre-empted by alternative 
wordings encountered in the input (Tomasello, 2003). Whatever the plausibility of this account, it 
is clear that learners must work out the properties of syntactic constructions largely on the basis 
of the input, its properties, and their analysis of it, not from explicit instruction or feedback on 
grammaticality. 
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  The above considerations all point in the same direction, namely, that the supervised 
learning paradigm may not be applicable to first-language acquisition. Words do not come tagged 
with their semantic and phonological categories, nor is information provided on which utterances 
count as ‘the same’ in form and in meaning. I will not, in the following, pursue the question of 
the learning of semantic categories. With respect to phonological categories, however, there are 
grounds for taking seriously the reality of unsupervised learning, exactly as the structuralist 
insistence on the separation of levels entailed. 
 
 
IV. UNSUPERVISED LEARNING OF PHONOLOGICAL CATEGORIES 
 
Categorization has been a major research topic in cognitive psychology; for a review of the by 
now voluminous literature, see Murphy (2002). Surveying this literature, one is struck by the fact 
that the vast bulk of the research has been in the supervised learning tradition, employing 
procedures that in the psychological literature are commonly referred to as ‘category formation’ 
experiments. The term may actually be something of a misnomer, since the categories in question 
have already been formed, namely, by the experimenter; the subject’s task would therefore be 
more accurately described as one of problem solving rather than category formation (Fodor 
1980). The subject, that is, has to work out the criteria by which certain stimuli have been put 
into a certain category, whereas other stimuli have not. Much of this research has been conducted 
on the example of visually presented stimuli; in comparison, the categorization of (non-linguistic) 
auditory stimuli has been neglected (but see Lotto, 2002). There is, however, a modest tradition 
of concept formation experiments conducted on the example of phonological categories (Jaeger, 
1980, 1986; Jaeger & Ohala, 1984; Mompeán, 2002; Weitzman, 1992). 
As mentioned, surprisingly little research has been conducted by cognitive psychologists 
on unsupervised learning, or ‘category construction’, as Murphy (2002: 126) calls it, in 
contradistinction to ‘category formation’. The little research that Murphy reports suggests that the 
categories that subjects spontaneously construct in such experiments are quite different from the 
categories that they normally operate with. There is a tendency, namely, for subjects to seize on a 
single dimension of the stimuli, such as their size, or colour, and to group them accordingly 
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(Murphy, 2002: 128). The complex, multi-dimensional, and probabilistic categories enshrined in 
the lexicons of human languages rarely emerge. 
Further perspectives on supervised and unsupervised learning are provided by the 
computational modelling of learning, especially in artificial neural networks (McLeod et al., 
1998). (It is, in fact, from the computational literature that I have taken the terms ‘supervised’ and 
‘unsupervised’). Consider a typical connectionist set-up. An array of input nodes is linked, 
possibly via one or more sets of hidden nodes, with an output array. Initially, the nodes are 
connected by randomly assigned connection weights. An input is presented, and the system’s 
output is compared with the ‘desired’ output. The connection weights are then adjusted so as to 
decrease the system’s error. The cycle is repeated – typically, many thousands of times – with 
each input being matched with a desired output. Eventually, the connection weights stabilize, and 
the system may be able to give the ‘correct’ output even for new inputs which it has never before 
encountered. One of the earliest and best-known applications of this procedure to language 
learning is Rumelhart & McClelland’s (1986) account of the training of a network to produce 
past tense forms of English verbs (for an update, see Plunkett, 1995). The procedure, it will be 
appreciated, rather closely models the psychologists’ category formation experiments. Thus in the 
psychologists’ experiments, we might suppose that at first subjects cannot make head or tail of 
the array of stimuli that they are presented with, and, like the neural network, give random 
responses. After repeated trials, in which feedback is provided, they increasingly come up with 
the ‘correct’ classification of the stimuli. 
Unsupervised learning in artificial neural networks involves the automatic recognition of 
patterns and regularities in the input. Several aspects of linguistic structure have been subjected to 
this kind of procedure. Thus, Goldsmith (2001) proposes a heuristic for automatic morpheme 
segmentation, while other aspects of linguistic analysis are addressed in Broeder & Murre (2000). 
For example, for Gillis, Daelmans, and Durieux (2000), the issue is the learnability of word stress 
rules on the basis of syllable structure and segmental features, while for Shillcock et al. (2000) 
the problem is to identify words from a phonemic transcription of connected speech (from which, 
of course, the word spaces had been removed). A common technique in unsupervised learning 
involves the use of clustering algorithms (Manning & Schütze, 1999). Each stimulus is defined as 
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a point in multi-dimensional space, and inputs cluster according to their relative closeness, with 
each new stimuli being ‘categorized’ in terms of the cluster it gets associated with. One of the 
best-known unsupervised procedures is the self-organizing maps of Kohonen (1982); a more 
sophisticated model has been developed by Kasabov (2002). Employing Kasabov’s ECOS (= 
‘Evolving Connectionist Systems’) model, Morales & Taylor (2005) found that the unsupervised 
learning of small vocabularies, the sole input to the system being digitized ‘signatures’ of 
different pronunciations of the words, turned out to be remarkably robust at the testing phrase, 
that is, in correctly classifying new pronunciations of the words. 
Under what circumstances might unsupervised learning take place in human subjects? 
One condition would be that the stimuli naturally cluster into so many categories. It might be the 
case, for example, that different sets of features co-occur in distinct sets of stimuli, or that a 
continuously varying feature has frequency-of-occurrence values that are bi-modally distributed 
over the stimuli. In such cases, the categories might be said to be ‘in the world’, in that the 
relevant categories can be identified in terms of feature correlations or feature maxima. 
It goes without saying that the learner has to be able to perceive the features in question. 
Consider, in addition, the possibility the learner may be innately predisposed to respond to certain 
features, or to certain dimensions of the stimuli. In this case, the emerging categories would be a 
function of the system’s perceptual mechanism, rather than feature correlation in the world. We 
can illustrate the issues on the categorization of colour. On the one hand, it could be argued that 
the colour solid represents a three-dimensional array of all possible colours (the three dimensions 
being hue, saturation, and brightness), with no natural boundaries or lines of segmentation. The 
colour solid does not naturally divide into so many categories. This aspect must be 
counterbalanced by the fact that not all the possible colours occur equally frequently in the 
environment. Regions in the colour space which dominate in the environment might therefore be 
good candidates for emergent categories. Research into the linguistic encoding of colour, 
however, has shown that different languages around the world tend to select their colour 
categories from a universal set of focal colours (Berlin & Kay, 1969). The focal colours are those 
which the human visual system is specifically attuned to respond to, such as red and green, blue 
and yellow in the first instance, and admixtures of these, such as orange, pink, and so on. The 
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focal colours are the ones that tend to be lexicalized first, in spite of the fact that they may occur 
relatively infrequently in nature (Taylor, 2003b) 
In light of the above remarks, let us now return to the learning of phonological categories. 
One of the most intensively studied features of the acoustic-phonetic signal is the role of Voice 
Onset Time (VOT) in the differentiation of different kinds of stops, such as voiced vs. voiceless, 
unaspirated vs. aspirated (Liberman et al., 1958; Lisker, 1978).12 It has also been established that 
prelinguistic infants are highly sensitive to differences in the VOT continuum (Eimas et al., 
1971). Some scholars, including Eimas, have suggested that this fact alone may be sufficient to 
trigger the formation of the respective categories; there would, therefore, be grounds to claim that 
the categorization of stop consonants is driven by innate properties of the human perceptual 
mechanism. Complicating the situation, however, is the fact that different languages exploit the 
VOT dimension in different ways. To the extent that VOT defines language-specific categories, 
these categories presumably have to be learned from experience. But even within a single 
language, it may be inappropriate to refer to the VOT values which differentiate the different 
categories of stops. VOT depends on many variables, such as the place of articulation of the stop 
(VOT values for bilabials are, on the whole, shorter than for velars; Lisker & Abramson, 1964), 
the prosodic properties of the syllable, i.e. whether stressed and foot-initial, or unstressed, the 
overall speech rate, and whether in utterance-initial position, and so on. These variations are 
subtle and numerous, and native proficiency in a language requires that they be learned 
(Pierrehumbert, 2003).  
Leaving aside these various sources of variation, let us consider the simplified case of 
stops in syllable- and foot- initial position, that is, in the onset position of stressed syllables, the 
kind of sounds, namely, that have been so intensively studied in the experimental literature over 
the past decades. Imagine two hypothetical languages, in which foot-initial VOT values between, 
say, -50 and +50ms, occur with more or less equal frequency. One language places the boundary 
between voiced and voiceless stops around +5 ms, the other places the boundary between 
voiceless unaspirated and voiceless aspirated stops around +25 ms. It will be apparent that the 
unsupervised learning of the respective categories will be all but impossible. The learner would 
need the information that in the one language, VOT-values of +10 and +40 count as ‘the same’, 
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in the other language they count as ‘different’. Unsupervised learning, however, would be 
feasible, if VOT values were bimodally distributed, clustering, for example, around +5 and +30. 
Frequency distribution of the stimuli would therefore naturally divide the stimuli into two 
categories. As it happens, VOT values in natural languages (in a given prosodic position) do 
indeed tend to be distributed in this way (Lisker & Abramson, 1964). 
The possibility that distributional properties of the input might drive category formation 
was investigated by Kornai (1998) with respect to the vowel formant data reported in Peterson & 
Barney (1952). Peterson & Barney took measurements of the first three formants of 10 American 
English vowels each of which was spoken twice by 76 talkers (men, women, and children). A 
first glance at a graph plotting the formant data for all the vowel tokens gives the impression of a 
broad swath of values, with few natural boundaries. Even so, as Kornai observes, the formant 
data present a picture very different from a random set of dots in 2- or 3-dimensional space. 
Kornai reports, in fact, that automatic clustering procedures were able to assign the formant 
values to 10 categories, whose central values corresponded rather closely with those of the 10 
intended vowels.13  
Could first language learners exploit distributional facts in the input to bootstrap the 
learning of phoneme categories? There is some evidence to suggest that they could. With respect 
to their sensitivity to statistical properties of the input, it has been demonstrated that prelinguistic 
children, when presented with strings of nonsense syllables, are able to utilize statistical 
information in order to identify recurring patterns of syllables as ‘words’ (Saffran et al., 1996). 
Support also comes from Maye & Gerken (2000) and Maye et al. (2002), who exposed learners 
to a range of stop-vowel stimuli which, in one condition, were unimodally distributed in terms of 
their frequency of presentation, and, in the other condition, bimodally distributed.14 When tested, 
learners in the latter condition (infants as well as adults) responded in a way suggesting that they 
had constructed two categories, whereas learners on the first condition did not. As Maye & 
Gerken (2000: 530) remark, it is as if listeners “maintain some sort of mental histogram”, 
tracking the frequency of occurrence of acoustic patterns they had encountered. Anderson et al. 
(2003) make a similar point, hypothesizing that the sequence in which phonological categories 
are acquired is driven by input frequencies.15 
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It is therefore entirely plausible that the phonetic categories distinctive of a particular 
language (such as the aspirated vs. unaspirated stops, or the various vowel categories) could be 
‘seeded’ during the first years of life by the statistical properties of the input. Further exposure to 
the language will, of course, be needed in order to sharpen and refine these categories (Bohn 
2000). There is evidence that this process may continue until well into the school years (Hazan & 
Barrett, 2000). Some additional aspects of this process are mentioned below. 
 
(i) Although a single dimension (such as VOT for the stop consonants, or formant frequencies for 
the vowels) may be sufficient to seed the respective categories, further exposure may enrich the 
category representations through the accretion of correlated properties. While VOT has been 
shown to be reliable cue for different kinds of stop consonants, VOT is not the only dimension 
differentiating the syllable-onset stops in English (Lisker, 1978). The intensity and spectral 
properties of the burst, the rate of change of formant transitions, and even the pitch of the ensuing 
vowel tend to correlate with the aspirated/unaspirated distinction, thus providing additional, 
though possibly redundant, cues for the characterization and differentiation of the respective 
categories. For vowels, an additional differentiating aspect is variations in duration (Peterson & 
Lehiste, 1960), and even differences in inherent pitch. Thus, all other things being equal, the 
duration of the vowel in sad [sæd] is likely to be greater than the duration of the vowel in said 
[sɛd].16 
 
(ii) As acquisition progresses, the categories will become subject to internal organization. 
Members of the same category will come to be perceived as increasingly similar, while 
perceptual differences between neighbouring categories are increased. Kuhl (1991) in this context 
speaks of the ‘perceptual magnet effect’ – outlying members of a category tend to be ‘drawn in’ 
towards its prototypical centre. Thus, speakers become increasingly desensitized to differences 
between stimuli belonging to the same category, but readily discriminate stimuli which lie just on 
either side of a category boundary. These constitute the well-studied phenomenon of categorical 
perception, defined, by Harnad (2003) as a situation where “perceived within-category 
36                                                                                                                                     John R. Taylor 
 
© Servicio de Publicaciones. Universidad de Murcia. All rights reserved.                   IJES, vol. 6 (2), 2006, pp. 19-54 
 
differences are compressed and/or between-category differences are separated, relative to some 
baseline of comparison”. 
 
(iii) The increasing size of the learner’s lexicon may also be a factor in phonological development 
(Beckman & Edwards, 2000). One might suppose that the ability to discriminate categories of 
sounds will entail that learners integrate these categories into their mental representations of 
words. Pater et al. (2004), however, report that infants who are able to discriminate pin and bin, 
bin and din, etc., were unable to associate these syllables with meaning differences in a word 
learning experiment. They explain this seemingly paradoxical finding in terms of the additional 
processing demands of word learning, involving the association of the acoustic stimuli with 
referential meaning. In early stages of language acquisition, therefore, words may well be 
represented in terms of their gross acoustic properties. As word learning gets under way, and the 
child’s lexicon increases in size, more accurate lexical storage will be necessary. This will not 
only strengthen the mental representation of the phonological categories, it will also reinforce 
their differentiating potential.  
 
 (iv) A further factor in the acquisition of phonological categories is the various ‘knowledge 
effects’ that come into play. I address this issue in the next section. 
 
 
V. KNOWLEDGE EFFECTS 
 
I have given a tentative account of how the phonetic shapes of words, such as coat and goat, ship 
and sheep, might plausibly be learned in an unsupervised learning situation. This account, 
however, does not equate to the learning of phonemes, as these are traditionally understood. What 
our hypothetical learner will have acquired are allophones, or “phonetic equivalence categories” 
(Maye & Gerken, 2000: 532), that is, categories which comprise sounds which occur in particular 
phonological positions. The key characteristic of phonemes is “equivalence across contexts” 
(Pierrehumbert, 2003: 118). The phoneme, namely, is the level of representation at which coat 
and goat, lack and lag, anchor and anger, bicker and bigger differ with respect to the very same 
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contrast, namely, /k/ vs. /g/. The words contain the ‘same’ sounds, albeit in different syllable and 
prosodic positions. Unsupervised learning might result in the acquisition of the properties of each 
of the above words, yet not deliver the insight that coat and goat differ in the same way as lack 
and lag. On what basis, therefore, can we say that coat, lack, anchor, and bicker all contain the 
‘same sound’, namely /k/? 
The standard structuralist answer to this question was that different sounds belong to a 
single phoneme category because of their similarity and their interchangeability. Referring to Z. 
Harris’s (1951: 20) statement that “[i]t is empirically discoverable that in all languages which 
have been described we can find some part of one utterance which will be similar to a part of 
some other utterance”, Hoijer (1958, cited in Heitner, 2005: 20) comments:   
 
‘Similar’ here means not physically identical but substitutable without obtaining a change 
in response from the native speakers who hear the utterance before and after the 
substitution: e.g., the last part of ‘He’s in’ is substitutable for the last part of ‘That’s my 
pin’ (Hoijer, 1958: 573). 
 
Drawing on the structuralist tradition, Quine (1987: 150) gave the following account: 
 
Two distinguishable sounds belong to the same phoneme, for a given language, if 
switching them does not change the meaning of any expression in that language: such is 
the ordinary uncritical definition of the phoneme (Quine, 1987: 150). 
 
Quine immediately modifies this in an attempt to exclude the controversial reference to 
‘meaning’:  
 
But meaning is a frail reed; surely the phonemes, the very building blocks of the 
language, are firmer than that. They are indeed, despite occasional misgivings to the 
point. There is an easy behavioral criterion of sameness of phoneme that presupposes no 
general notion of sameness of meaning. Two sounds belong to the same phoneme if 
substitution of one for the other does not affect a speaker’s disposition to assent to any 
sentence (pp. 150-151). 
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 The claims made here are open to question on several counts. Consider, first, the issue of 
substitutability. Just as Pike (1947) queried whether linguists of his time really did pursue 
phonemic analysis without any reference to meaning, we can also ask ourselves whether anybody 
ever did perform the substitution tests. Nowadays, since the advent of digital signal processing, it 
is a relatively simple matter to cross-splice parts of recorded utterances. In earlier times, the 
experiment would have involved (literally) cutting up lengths of magnetic tape and sticking the 
bits together in a different sequence – a messy and time-consuming process at best, and prone to 
all kinds of errors and misjudgements. If such substitution experiments had been performed, the 
responses of native speakers might not at all have corroborated the phonemic analyses that the 
investigator was trying to validate. For example, if one cross-splices the initial /h/ sounds of who 
and heat, the resulting forms do not at all sound like who and heat, or even like English words at 
all. Or consider the initial and final consonants of a word like tot. If the final ‘t’ were to be 
glottalized – a rather frequent pronunciation in many accents – interchanging the initial and final 
segments would, if anything, produce a word roughly transcribable as [t], and heard as 
something like ott. Again, the two ‘t’s cannot reasonably be said to be substitutable. When 
linguists, whether professional like Hoijer, or amateur like Quine, made statements about 
‘substitution’ as the basis of phonemic analysis, we are dealing, I suspect, with armchair 
experimentation, intended to give a spurious air of scientific grounding to the enterprise.17 
 The claim that sounds are assigned to the same phoneme category on the basis of their 
phonetic similarity also does not hold up to scrutiny. As mentioned, the initial segments of who 
and heat – which, in terms of their articulation, are voiceless anticipations of the following 
vowels, phonetically [u] and [i] – do not sound at all similar, when excised from their context. 
(One would not, for example, want to claim that whispered versions of [u] and [i] are ‘similar’, 
and for this reason assign them to the same phoneme category). Likewise, there is little acoustic 
similarity between a glottal stop and an aspirated [t], in the above-mentioned pronunciation of 
tot. Conversely, the unstressed [] in classify, if voiceless (which it might well be), is essentially 
the same sound as the initial /h/ of hit (Pierrehumbert, 2003: 129), yet no one, presumably, would 
want to claim that the sounds are members of the same phoneme.  
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We need to look elsewhere for the source of intuitions about “equivalence across 
contexts”. The place to look, I suggest, is the ‘knowledge base’ of categories (cf. Mompeán, 
2004). In a seminal paper, Murphy & Medin (1985) posed the question why some groupings of 
objects are “informative, useful, and efficient”, whereas others are “vague, absurd, or useless” (p. 
289). They dismiss as simplistic the view that entities cohere in a category on the basis of their 
similarity; after all, some kind of similarity can be perceived in any grouping of objects. Rather, 
category coherence is a function of some ‘underlying principle’, or ‘theory’, which ‘explains’ 
why the entities should be grouped together, e.g. in terms of encyclopaedic knowledge of the 
domain, presumptions about causal connections, or the role of the entities within scripts and 
scenarios. Rather than entities being categorized on the basis of their similarity, it is the ‘theory’ 
relating the entities that makes them seem similar (p. 291). The intuitions of native speakers (and 
of linguists) that who and heat begin with similar-sounding segments would be the consequence 
of phonemic categorization, not its cause.  
With regard to phonetic segments, an important piece of knowledge concerns how these 
sounds are made – which articulators are involved, manner of airflow, and so forth. Thus, for 
English, the initial and final segments of tot both involve alveolar closure with no accompanying 
vocal fold vibration, even though the acoustic effects of the articulation are very different for 
onset and coda consonants. Knowledge of the articulation could therefore support the grouping of 
the initial and final consonants into a single category. Jusczyk, in fact, has argued that a major 
impetus for the emergence of phoneme categories could well be the need for the learner to 
coordinate perception and production:18 
 
From the standpoint of word recognition, there is no need of an ability to detect the 
similarity in the initial portions of the words “big,” “beet,” “bop,” and “bun.” Nor is there 
any particular need for the speech perception system to extract any similarity between the 
way that the word “park” begins and the way that “tip” ends (although this ability is 
critical for learning to read English). However, in order to produce, and reproduce, any of 
these items correctly on another occasion, it may be helpful to take note of any 
similarities in the articulatory gestures that are required to produce these (Jusczyk, 1997: 
205). 
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These remarks are relevant also for non-canonical articulations of stops. For example, 
stops in other than onset position of stressed syllables might not achieve full closure. Upper may 
be pronounced as [], bigger as [b]. Here, the gesture towards closure is made, but is not 
fully achieved. Knowledge of the articulations may thus support the intuition that [] and [] are 
members of the /p/ and /g/ categories, respectively. Or consider the fact that in many accents of 
English, a coda /t/ (under certain prosodic conditions) is typically glottalized, that is, the alveolar 
closure is made simultaneously with a glottal closure [t] If, furthermore, glottal closure should 
momentarily precede alveolar closure, there may well be no trace of the alveolar closure in the 
acoustic signal. The alveolar gesture may nevertheless be present, and could give rise to the 
intuition that the final [] is still a kind of /t/. Examples of this kind of ‘hidden’ articulation (that 
is, articulations with no auditory consequences) are documented in Browman & Goldstein 
(1992). 
A second source of knowledge concerns dialectal and stylistic variants. There is no such 
thing as the perfectly homogeneous linguistic community of Chomsky’s (1965: 1) idealization. 
Even leaving aside dialectal variation, each speaker commands a range of stylistic varieties, and 
comes into contact with many different speaking styles. Observing that cat is variably 
pronounced [kæts], [kæt], [kæt] , [kæt] , and [kæ], the learner may come to group these 
different coda sounds as different kinds of /t/. Similarly, observing that in slow, careful 
pronunciation, city has a medial [t], whereas in rapid speech it has the flap [], the flap may again 
be assimilated to the /t/ category, in spite of its phonetic distinctiveness.  
A third influence would be knowledge of the orthography. The flap in city might well be 
identical in articulation to the flap in ready. Knowledge of how these words are spelled, however, 
could cause the first to be categorized as a kind of ‘t’, the latter as a kind of ‘d’. Knowledge of 
morphological relations might also come into play. The perception of the flap in madder as being 
an example of /d/ rather than /t/ could be a consequence of the fact that the speaker knows that 
madder is derived from mad. Both these issues are extensively discussed in Mompeán (2004). 
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I have outlined some of the factors which might contribute to the emergence of the 
phoneme concept. The possibility still remains, however, that phoneme categories might be 
inventions of analyzing linguists, which play no role in the mental representations of 
linguistically naïve speakers. As Jaeger (1980: 233) put it, “even the most basic or self-evident” 
claims of theoretical linguistics need to be subjected to empirical investigation. A number of 
scholars, including Jaeger (1980) and Mompeán (2002: Experiment 3), have indeed attempted to 
demonstrate the psychological reality of the phoneme concept, with encouraging results. Thus, 
Jaeger found evidence that subjects classified various allophones and positional variants of /k/ 
into a single category, while Mompeán reported analogous findings for the allophones of /p/. It 
should be borne in mind, however, that both researchers employed a concept formation 
paradigm,19 in the supervised learning tradition, as described above. It cannot, therefore, be ruled 
out that the experimental subjects were simply able to solve the categorization puzzle that they 
had been presented with, with no implications that the subjects had prior mental representations 
of categories, nor, even less, that the categories played a role in the subjects’ day-to-day linguistic 
performance.20 On the other hand, the fact that all 9 of Jaeger’s subjects, and all 20 of 
Mompeán’s, were able to form the categories to criterion,21 would suggest that the subjects were 
indeed tapping into their mental representations of the respective categories, rather than 
constructing ad hoc categories in response to the experimental tasks. 
A word of caution is necessary, however. English speakers who ‘have’ the relevant 
phoneme categories readily appreciate that cat, tack, and act contain the ‘same’ three sounds, 
arranged in different sequences. Indeed, the insight that words can be segmented into smaller 
units, and that these units recur in different words, would seem to be a prerequisite for mastery of 
an alphabetic writing system (Treiman & Baron, 1981), even though, as the example of cat, tack, 
and act shows, the correspondence between phonemes and letters is not always one-to-one. 
Continuing experience with an alphabetic writing system will only serve to strengthen and 
entrench the phoneme concept and its application to the words on the language. As Kornai (1998) 
observes, “to the extent that a … phoneme based writing system can easily be acquired and 
consistently used by any speaker of the language, the psychological reality of the units forming 
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the basis of the system becomes hard to deny”. To be sure, the segmental phonemic analyses 
made by children learning the writing system may not always correspond with the analyses of 
professional linguists, nor even with the analyses that are enshrined in the writing system 
(Treiman, 1985). Neither is it the case that all children achieve the phonemic insight at the same 
time, and at the same rate. Even ‘wrong’ segmentation, though, still testifies to the 
implementation of some segmentation strategy, and could be taken as evidence that the phonemic 
insight is present. It may be, however, that some speakers never achieve the initial phonemic 
insight. Mattingly (1972) and Sampson (1985: 163) suggest that residual levels of illiteracy, even 
in societies with universal education, are due to the fact that a small minority of individuals fail to 
appreciate the phonemic structure of their language. While illiteracy, in a predominantly literate 
society, obviously impacts on a person’s linguistic development in many ways (for example, by 
depriving them of exposure to literary styles and genres, and their associated syntactic and lexical 
properties), we probably should not conclude that the basic speaking and listening abilities of 
these individuals will be substantially impaired vis-à-vis that of their literate compatriots. Maye 
& Gerken (2000: 532) suggest that “phonetic equivalence categories … could plausibly be the 
only psychological correlates” (authors’ emphasis) of the linguist’s phonemes. In view of the 
experimental evidence cited above, as well as the fact of widespread literacy in alphabetic writing 
systems, this is probably an overly cautious view. On the other hand, knowledge of phonetic 
equivalence categories (i.e. positional allophones) could plausibly be sufficient for speaking and 
listening proficiency to be guaranteed.  
 
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
As stated earlier in this paper, the phoneme concept is controversial. I have framed the above 
discussion around some of the controversies which were current during the heyday of 
Bloomfieldian structuralism, in the mid decades of the last century, concerning the criteria by 
which phonemes are to be identified. As is well-known, the advent of generative phonology, in 
the 1960’s and 1970’s, ushered in new controversies. Specifically, generative phonologists such 
as Postal (1968) and Chomsky & Halle (1968) queried the need for a phonemic level of 
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representation at all, proposing instead that a battery of ordered rules was able to generate the 
surface form of an utterance (roughly, the utterance in a narrow phonetic transcription) directly 
from a unique representation of each constituent morpheme, with no special theoretical status 
attaching to an intervening phonemic representation. Crucial to their argument for ignoring the 
phoneme was the fact that certain rules (e.g. of assimilation) sometime seemed to bypass the 
phonemic level altogether,22 while others appeared to create surface contrasts (i.e., minimal pairs) 
which did not correspond with intuitions about a phonemic level.23 Even so, as Schane (1971) 
observed, the output of one set of rules – the morphophonemic rules – did correspond, by and 
large, with what would earlier have been called a phonemic representation, while the phonetic 
rules corresponded, by and large, with what would have been regarded as phoneme realization 
rules.  
The generative phonology approach, it will be observed, was strictly ‘top-down’, in the 
sense that details of surface pronunciations were derived from more abstract representations, 
rather than vice-versa. Generative phonology thus inverted the ‘bottom-up’ programme of the 
Bloomfieldians. From the perspective of the child acquiring an ambient language, a top-down 
approach can be viable only if one makes the gratuitous assumption that the abstract units are 
already available to the learner, namely, through genetic inheritance (Lindblom, 2000). This is a 
dubious proposition, if only because of the language-specificity of the more abstract categories 
(such as the phonemes). If we make – as I think we should – minimal assumptions concerning the 
learner’s initial state, we are obliged to consider seriously the bottom-up perspective. This has 
been my aim in this paper.  
Chomsky (1964) spoke disparagingly of the ‘taxonomic phoneme’. Underlying the 
present account is, on the contrary, the view that phonemes are properly regarded as categories 
whose members are positional allophones; these latter in turn are also categories, whose members 
are encountered utterance events (cf. Nathan, 1986). Phonemes, therefore, take their place within 
a taxonomy of phonetic segments. The taxonomy need not, of course, stop at the phoneme. 
Phonemes might be grouped together in higher level, i.e. more ‘schematic’ categories, such as 
‘vowel’ and ‘consonant’, with several intervening categories in between, such as ‘obstruent’, 
‘nasal’, ‘front vowel’, ‘short vowel’, and so on. The very essence of the phoneme is, therefore, its 
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taxonomic status. If this view of the phoneme is accepted, then the extensive research on 
categorization and taxonomies that has been conducted by psychologists, and cognitive scientists 
more generally, becomes relevant to phonological theory. It becomes legitimate to enquire, for 
example, whether phoneme categories exhibit prototype effects, whether phonemes might be 
considered as ‘basic level’ categories within a taxonomic hierarchy, and what the distinctive 
properties of categories that are ‘superordinate’ and ‘subordinate’ to the basic level might be. 
These questions are touched on in Taylor (2002: to appear). A full discussion, however, must 
await a sequel to this paper.  
 
NOTES  
 
1. “Psychologically, setting aside its expression in words, our thought is simply a vague, shapeless mass. ... [W]ere it 
not for signs, we should be incapable of differentiating any two ideas in a clear and constant way. In itself, thought is 
like a swirling cloud, where no shape is intrinsically determinate. No ideas are established in advance, and nothing is 
distinct, before the introduction of linguistic structure.” (Saussure/Harris, 1983: 155) 
 
2. “The substance of sound is no more fixed or rigid than that of thought. It does not offer a ready-made mould, with 
shapes that thought must inevitably conform to. It is a malleable material which can be fashioned into separate parts 
in order to supply the signals which thought is in need of.” (Saussure/Harris,1983: 155). 
 
3. Strictly speaking, of course, the input to acquisition is not just auditory, but (in the case of sighted individuals) 
auditory-visual, in that the learner has access to visual information pertaining to the speaker’s lip and jaw 
movements.  
 
4. This statement leaves open the question of what constitutes a ‘word’ for purposes of perception, storage, and 
retrieval. The category comprises, in the first instance, word forms, such as run, runs, running, but also 
‘phonological words’, such as cuppa [kp] in cup of tea. Frequently occurring combinations, such as all gone, bye-
bye, and good-night, might also have word-like status, at least for the young child. These issues, though important, 
are not strictly relevant to the point made in this paragraph. 
 
5. Analysis and segmentation does not, of course, entail that words will cease to be stored as wholes. To claim this, 
would be to fall foul of the ‘rule-list fallacy’ (Langacker, 1987). It is plausible, indeed likely, that words continue to 
be stored as phonological wholes at the same time as their phonological constituents are recognized (cf. Lachs et al., 
2000). 
 
6. Cf. Sapir’s (1921: 56) often-cited remark: “In watching my Nootka interpreter write his language, I often had the 
curious feeling that he was transcribing an ideal flow of phonetic elements which he heard, inadequately from a 
purely objective standpoint, as the intention of the actual rumble of speech”. 
 
7. A couple of representative statements:  Hockett (1942: 20) asserted that “no grammatical fact of any kind is used 
in making phonological analysis”, while Bloch (1948: 5) declared: “we shall avoid all semantic and psychological 
criteria. The implication is, of course, that such criteria play no part, or at least need not play one, in the theoretical 
foundation of phonemics. … The basic assumptions that underlie phonemics, we believe, can be stated without any 
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mention of mind and meaning”. Bloch did, however, concede that in practice a linguist would appeal to meaning, but 
only as a “shortcut”. 
 
8. For the Bloomfieldian structuralists, with their fiercely anti-mentalist stance, it would have been unscientific to 
attribute psychological reality to their analyses. Nowadays, largely as a result of the ‘cognitive turn’ initiated by 
Chomsky, we have few qualms about crossing the boundary between the subject matter of linguistics and the 
cognitive states and processes of a language user. A linguistic description, namely, is taken as a hypothesis about a 
speaker’s mental representations, and a linguist’s analytical procedures may be regarded as analogous to those of the 
child language learner. 
 
9. Quine (1960) posed the question of how a field linguist, on observing the native to utter gavagai on seeing a 
rabbit, would establish that gavagai means ‘rabbit’. Gavagai could mean many things, only some of which could be 
subject to empirical disconfirmation. 
 
10. See, however, Werker (2003) for a more recent view of the matter. 
 
11. Daniel Jones insisted that “it is incumbent on us to distinguish between what phonemes are and what they do” 
(Jones, 1973 [1957]: 28). Thus, the possibility of lexical contrasts (i.e. minimal pairs) should be seen as a 
consequence of the existence of phonemic categories, not their defining, or causal feature: “An important point to 
notice is that the phoneme is essentially a phonetic conception. The fact that certain sounds are used in a language for 
distinguishing the meanings of words doesn’t enter into the definition of a phoneme. It would indeed be possible to 
group the sounds of a language into phonemes without knowing the meaning of any words” (Jones, 1929, quoted in 
Bloch,1948: 6). For a critique of the view that phonemes are inherently contrastive entities, see Berg (1993). 
 
12. VOT is the duration, usually measured in milliseconds, between the release of a stop closure and the onset of 
voicing, typically diagnosed by the presence of periodicity in the wave form. A positive VOT value, e.g. +50, 
indicates that voicing sets in after the release; a negative value, e.g. -50, indicates that voicing sets in before the 
release. 
 
13. The clustering experiment reported by Kornai did, however, specify the number of target clusters as 10. This 
would correspond to a situation in which a learner is informed about the number of vowel categories in a language, 
and is left to work out to which of the categories individual tokens are to be assigned. 
 
14. The experiments were conducted with English speakers, and concerned the contrast between initial voiced stops 
(as in die) and unaspirated voiceless stops, such as occur, after an initial ‘s’, in sty. The contrast is alien to the 
phonological system of English. 
 
15. A reviewer takes issue with the notion of the statistical learning of phonetic categories, pointing out that 
"speakers are not tape recorders... they don't just record sound images and compare them.” However, the results 
obtained by Maye and Gerken (2002) are very strong evidence that listeners do indeed record and compare even 
minute phonetic details of heard utterances; without some such mechanism, it is difficult to imagine how their results 
could be explained at all. Listeners’ attention to, and retention of, fine acoustic-phonetic detail is also supported by 
research by Goldinger (1996) and by Lachs, McMichael and Pisoni (2000). Circumstantial evidence is the fact, noted 
by Pierrehumbert (2003, 120), that the properties of phonetic categories are in the main language-specific; 
consequently, these properties “must be learned by native speakers, because they have consequences for category 
boundaries in perception and because they must be accurately reproduced to achieve a native accent in production.” 
It may be relevant, also, to recall that for Slobin (1985), one of the “operating principles” enabling language 
acquisition to take place, was: “Keep track of the frequency of occurrence of every unit and pattern that you store”. 
The role of the frequency of occurrence in language acquisition has been reviewed by Ellis (2002). 
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16. Bohn and Flege (1990; 1992) report that second language learners of English – for whom the [æ]–[] and [i]–[] 
contrasts are notoriously difficult – may rely predominantly on durational differences, unlike native English 
speakers, who rely predominantly on spectral differences. 
 
17. A more generous interpretation of the substitution test would be that the analyzing linguist would replace one 
phonetic symbol in a transcription by another and then try to articulate the result. The feasibility of this enterprise 
presupposes that phonetic symbols accurately represent the acoustic properties of the speech signal, which, in the 
case of the stop consonants, is at best questionable. 
 
18. Barring pathological cases, speakers are also listeners, and vice versa. Thus, a speaker is continually presented 
with the auditory consequences of her own articulations. Without needing to subscribe to the now largely discredited 
motor theory, with its claim that speech sounds are perceived in terms of the articulations that produced them, we can 
suppose (as a reviewer has suggested) that listeners will be inclined to intuit the articulatory intentions of a speaker. 
This suggestion links up with a wider theme in the acquisition literature, namely, the view that language acquisition 
may be driven by the learner’s ability to read the intentions of an interlocutor (Taylor, 2002: 67-8; Tomasello, 1999). 
The matter has been investigated mainly from the point of view of the learning of word meanings, rather than with 
respect to the learning of phonetic categories. 
  
19 This, at least, is true of Jaeger’s Experiment 2. Experiment 1 used a classical conditioning paradigm, in which the 
results from 10 out of 16 subjects had to be discarded. 
 
20. Imagine, for example, a concept formation experiment, in which the concept to be acquired is defined by the 
features [two-syllable word] and [beginning with either /l/ or /s/]. The fact that some subjects might be able to form 
this category to criterion would not entitle us to infer that the category plays any role whatsoever in the subjects’ 
mental representation of their language. 
 
21. In contrast, 6 of Mompeán’s 20 subjects (2002: Experiment 1) failed to form the category ‘(word-initial) 
consonant’. This finding could be interpreted to mean that the superordinate category ‘consonant’ is less available to 
consciousness than a basic level phoneme category such as /p/. 
 
22. For example, nasal consonants typically assimilate to the place of articulation of a following obstruent. In words 
such as link [lk], imp [mp], and sent [snt], the assimilated nasals would be assigned, unproblematically, to the 
phonemes //, /m/, and /n/, respectively. But in the case of comfort [kft] and camphor [kæf], it is by no 
means obvious to which phoneme the assimilated [] should be assigned. In the first set of examples, assimilation 
determines the occurrence of different phonemes, in the second set, assimilation results in a sound whose phonemic 
status is uncertain. The two sets can be unified by assuming an underlying nasal segment, which receives its place 
feature through assimilation, thereby removing the need for a distinctive phonemic level of representation. 
 
23 An example of this kind of spurious minimal pair is the contrast, in some dialects, between cat [kæt] and can’t 
[kæt]. 
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